Gunboats for China’s New “Grand Canals”?—Probing the Intersection of Beijing’s Naval and Oil Security Policies by Erickson, Andrew & Goldstein, Lyle
Naval War College Review
Volume 62
Number 2 Spring Article 6
2009
Gunboats for China’s New “Grand
Canals”?—Probing the Intersection of Beijing’s
Naval and Oil Security Policies
Andrew Erickson
Lyle Goldstein
Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Erickson, Andrew and Goldstein, Lyle (2009) "Gunboats for China’s New “Grand Canals”?—Probing the Intersection of Beijing’s
Naval and Oil Security Policies," Naval War College Review: Vol. 62 : No. 2 , Article 6.
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol62/iss2/6
ver a millennium ago, a waterway known as the Grand Canal, connect-
ing the seaport of Hangzhou with Beijing in the north, became a criti-
cal artery for the dynamic growth of Chinese civilization. In the last decade, 
the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) connecting China to the Middle East 
and Africa have assumed a similarly vital role as a major “center of gravity” for 
Chinese economic development. With Chinese oil demand growing rapidly and 
seaborne oil imports constituting more than 80 percent of total oil imports, 
China’s new “Grand Canal” has also become a vital oil lifeline. In 2007, approxi-
mately 85 percent of Chinese oil imports passed through the Strait of Malacca; 
Chinese writings commonly refer to this critical vulnerability as the “Malacca 
Dilemma” (马六甲困局). Given these developments, along with the 26 Decem-
ber 2008 deployment of two destroyers and one supply vessel from the People’s 
Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to support counter-piracy operations in the Gulf 
of Aden, it is time to consider seriously the prospect of future PLAN missions to 
defend Chinese interests not only in East Asia but also beyond. 
Against this strategic backdrop, it is not surprising that some Chinese naval and 
maritime affairs analysts believe that China needs the military capacity to protect 
its long and increasingly vital maritime oil supply lines.1 Defense of oil SLOCs 
may become a driver in future PLAN evolution;2 this 
would be particularly the case if the Taiwan issue were 
to become a lesser concern to the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC).3 Indeed, a major U.S. government report 
states that “as China’s economy grows, dependence on 
secure access to markets and natural resources, 
The authors are research faculty in the Center for Na-
val Warfare Studies at the Naval War College in New-
port, Rhode Island. Professors Erickson and Goldstein 
are members (Dr. Goldstein is the founding director) 
of the College’s China Maritime Studies Institute. 
Naval War College Review, Spring 2009, Vol. 62, No. 2
O
Andrew Erickson and Lyle Goldstein
Probing the Intersection of Beijing’s Naval and Oil Security Policies
guNBOatS fOr chINa’S New “graNd caNalS”?
1
Erickson and Goldstein: Gunboats for China’s New “Grand Canals”?—Probing the Intersection
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2009
 44 naval war college review
particularly metals and fossil fuels, is becoming a more significant factor shap-
ing China’s strategic behavior.”4 A shift in naval-mission focus from consolidat-
ing control of China’s maritime periphery to pursuing SLOC security would 
represent a major reconceptualization of Chinese national security, one with 
wide-ranging international implications. Examining the Indian case, moreover, 
illustrates that promotion of blue-water naval capabilities in China is not un-
usual for a developing major power.5 
The possible interaction between China’s developing oil security and naval 
strategies poses important questions. Gunboats were once used to invade China 
in the name of protecting international commerce. Now China is itself acquir-
ing powerful warships, but its precise reasons for doing so remain unclear. What 
relationships do Chinese civilian and military leaders envision between mari-
time commerce, oil availability, and the use of force in international affairs? 
Such questions appear to be largely undecided in China. They perplex the U.S. 
Department of Defense, which stated in 2008 that “the extent to which Beijing’s 
concerns over the security of its access to oil supplies shapes China’s defense 
policy and force planning is not known.”6 But they are questions that China will 
increasingly confront in the future, as its role on the global stage, including both 
economic and military aspects, continues to increase. 
The maritime dimensions of China’s emerging oil security strategy have re-
ceived considerable attention from analysts, both inside and outside the nation.7 
But to date, few scholars have attempted to analyze comprehensively oil security–
related writings in Chinese naval and maritime publications. This article will 
therefore offer possible answers to these questions and attempt to fill an impor-
tant gap in the existing literature by surveying the maritime oil security discus-
sions conducted by Chinese naval and energy specialists. 
China’s dominant domestic oil players are, first, the national oil companies 
and, second, the State Council, with its National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC)—not the security establishment.8 Yet maritime oil secu-
rity is generally not addressed in documents published by these entities, a fact 
that raises questions as to how oil security is conceptualized by China’s leader-
ship, which, by default, would likely handle such issues.9 
Chinese maritime writings, by contrast, have proliferated in recent years.10 
At least five PRC professional publications concerned with naval development 
have appeared, as well as a plethora of books discussing the direction of Chinese 
naval modernization.11 Few other Chinese publications analyze maritime oil 
security in detail.12 A survey of China’s official naval journal, 当代海军 (Modern 
Navy), from 2003 to 2006 reveals relatively few articles devoted to maritime oil 
security issues. Nevertheless, these articles cite China’s perceived naval weakness 
as a key cause of oil insecurity.13 The tenor of these discussions suggests a strong 
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disinclination by Chinese naval strategists to accept American or Western con-
trol over Beijing’s “oil lifeline” (石油生命线).14 This unease may well help to fuel 
China’s ongoing naval buildup. However, one principal finding of this article is 
that some Chinese naval and maritime affairs analysts are pragmatic and advo-
cate cooperation with other oil-consuming great powers, including the United 
States, in order to secure stability of the oil and gas supply. 
This analysis has eight sections. The first establishes a geostrategic context for 
China’s current naval and oil security–related actions and explores the role of oil 
in China’s recent turn to the sea. The second and third sections explore Chinese 
perceptions of the roles of SLOCs and potential threats to them, respectively. 
A fourth section discusses People’s Liberation Army (PLA) doctrinal writings 
relevant to SLOC protection missions. The fifth explores future naval implica-
tions of a more assertive Chinese naval presence driven by oil security concerns. 
Section six offers potential leading indicators of Chinese development of a navy 
capable of long-range SLOC protection. The seventh section examines Chinese 
arguments in favor of international SLOC security cooperation. The final sec-
tion summarizes the findings and offers reason to believe that U.S.-China en-
ergy cooperation is quite possible in the maritime sphere.
The ConTexT for naval and oil SeCuriTy STraTegy  
developmenT
In comparison to those of Japan or Taiwan, mainland China’s overall energy 
imports are low.15 Domestic energy production remains centered on coal (about 
70 percent of total supply), of which China has the world’s third-largest reserves, 
after the United States and Russia. China is the only northeast Asian country 
to have these advantages. However, the country’s oil use and oil import depen-
dence have been rising rapidly since China became a net oil importer in 1993. 
While still a very significant oil producer, China now imports half of its crude 
oil needs of more than 7.7 million barrels per day. Oil security has become a hot 
discussion topic, because although oil occupies a minority share in the overall 
national energy balance, it currently has no large-scale substitutes as a transport 
fuel. Without adequate oil supplies, China’s economy would grind to a halt as 
fuel shortages shut down trucks, ships, aircraft, and much of the rail system.16
For these reasons, as well as the Chinese Communist Party’s more general 
imperative to orchestrate rapid economic development, resource acquisition ap-
pears to have become a major focus of Beijing’s pragmatic foreign policy. This 
features sophisticated diplomacy, commercial initiatives, a flexible approach to 
problem solving that prioritizes economic and social progress over governance 
standards or individual human rights, and a new willingness to assume interna-
tional responsibilities (e.g., peacekeeping and anti-piracy operations). 
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China’s emphasis on resource supply security is driven fundamentally by in-
ternal development requirements, but against the backdrop of China’s impres-
sive naval modernization over the past decade, concerns about potential Chinese 
naval development trajectories do arise. China has been building four classes 
of submarines simultaneously. It is also improving its amphibious warfare, air 
defense, and antiship missile capabilities. Furthermore, whereas old military 
and strategic debates focused on Taiwan contingencies, the new strategic ques-
tions concern what may be wider 
regional, and potentially global, 
ambitions emerging in Beijing.17 
Yet at this point, in the assessment 
of the U.S. Defense Department, 
China “is neither capable of using 
military power to secure its foreign energy investments nor of defending critical 
sea lanes against disruption.”18
To address these questions, it is critical to understand China’s debate over en-
ergy strategy. Chinese oil security writings are increasingly numerous, reflecting 
a vigorous national debate among civilian experts and scholars. “Free marke-
teers” believe that markets are the best tool to ensure a secure supply of import-
ed oil. Beijing University’s Zha Daojiong, for instance, argues that China’s path 
to oil security lies in greater integration with the existing global oil market.19 
Some analysts believe that transnational and nonhuman threats to maritime oil 
security are as important as, or more important than, interstate threats.20 There 
are pragmatists at Chinese naval institutions who believe that oil security can be 
achieved through diplomacy.21 
But there are also mercantilists, who take a darker view based on the zero-
sum premise that dwindling oil supplies compel each consumer to fight for ex-
clusive control of resources. They believe that China must control its foreign oil 
supplies from wellhead to gas pump and are typically more inclined than others to-
ward using military power to guarantee oil-supply security. For instance, Zhang 
Wenmu, of Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, a major public 
intellectual, writes that China must control its sea-based oil supplies: “We must 
build up our navy as quickly as possible. . . . Otherwise, China may lose every-
thing it has gathered in normal international economic activities, including its 
oil interests, in a military defeat.”22 While Zhang’s writing appears to have at-
tracted a limited following, it is conspicuous for its apparent lack of calculation 
of costs or of potential balancing reaction by others, or any clear estimate or 
plan about exactly what kind of naval capabilities China would need for what 
kind of scenarios. There is a wide and sophisticated array of viewpoints even in 
China’s naval studies community.
“Our economic development generates the 
need of overseas resources and markets, and 
there are hidden dangers in the security of our 
development.”
4
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The role of oil reSourCe proTeCTion in China’S mariTime 
developmenT
Despite its largely insular, continental history, China appears to be turning de-
cisively to the sea as its trade relationships blossom and resource demand grows. 
In 2006, maritime industries accounted for $270 billion in economic output 
(nearly 10 percent of GDP).23 Extensive foreign oil resources are required to sus-
tain China’s growth, and some Chinese analysts appear to assume that there will 
be an unrelenting, zero-sum competition for access to them.24 This justification 
has been present in the Chinese literature since the 1980s or early 1990s. In fact, 
it was in some ways more prevalent in those years (though not in connection 
with the Middle East/Malacca Straits but, rather, oil and resources in the South 
China Sea). The PLAN attempted to use these factors to justify budgets and 
modernization plans, because at the time the Taiwan and U.S. issues were less 
pressing.25 One explanation for the content of maritime debates is the context of 
domestic bureaucratic and political wrangling for defense budget and procure-
ment priority. 
In the future, if tensions between China and the United States over Taiwan 
ease, maritime interests and SLOC security might reemerge as a basis for justifi-
cations of missions and modernization programs and budgets for the PLAN. Yet 
this may not be driven only by a perception of actual international interests and 
China’s security environment; another driver may be a struggle by the PLAN to 
secure a greater portion of the PLA budget, particularly if it is able to improve 
its status vis-à-vis the PLA ground forces. This possibility is hardly far-fetched: 
China’s 2008 Defense White Paper for the first time treats the ground forces as a 
distinct service equivalent to the Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery, suggest-
ing that they are becoming less dominant within the military and that the PLAN 
may grow correspondingly over time in funding and mission scope.26
Today, Beijing appears to believe that China’s maritime commercial and oil 
interests might need increasing protection. At an expanded Central Military 
Commission conference on 24 December 2004, Chairman Hu Jintao introduced 
a new military policy that defined the four new missions of the PLA: first, to 
serve as an “important source of strength” for the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) to “consolidate its ruling position”; second, to “provide a solid securi-
ty guarantee for sustaining the important period of strategic opportunity for 
national development”;27 third, to “provide a strong strategic support for safe-
guarding national interests”; and fourth, to “play an important role in main-
taining world peace and promoting common development.”28 
The last two missions reflect new emphases for the PLA, and the fourth is 
unprecedented. According to a subsequent article in Liberation Army Daily, the 
third includes maritime rights and interests. Specifically, Hu requires the PLA 
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“to not only pay close attention to the interests of national survival, but also 
national development interests; not only safeguard the security of national ter-
ritory, territorial waters, and airspace, but also safeguard electromagnetic space, 
outer space, the ocean, and other aspects of national security.”29 On 27 December 
2006, in a speech to People’s Liberation Army Navy officers attending a Com-
munist Party meeting, Hu referred to China as “a great maritime power (海洋大
国)” and declared that China’s “navy force should be strengthened and modern-
ized” and should continue moving toward “blue water” capabilities.30 China’s 
2006 Defense White Paper further states that China’s “navy aims at gradual ex-
tension of the strategic depth for offshore defensive operations and enhancing 
its capabilities in integrated maritime operations.”31 
China’s 2008 Defense White Paper adds that “the Navy has been striving . . . to 
gradually develop its capabilities of conducting cooperation in distant waters.” 
It arguably alludes to oil security in describing the present state of the world: 
“Struggles for strategic resources, strategic locations and strategic dominance 
have intensified.”32 But oil security is not mentioned directly in Hu’s redefini-
tion of PLA policy, raising the question of whether an oil security/SLOC mis-
sion is specifically sanctioned by China’s leadership. This is hardly surprising, 
as Chinese leadership pronouncements tend to represent abstract distillations of 
high-level consensus, particularly concerning emerging issues for which specific 
policy has yet to be decided. Potential factors that could motivate expansion of 
PLAN activities include: first, a perceived need to protect Chinese shipping and 
resource supply lines and, second, to make sure that China can handle a Taiwan 
crisis and other regional contingencies; third, bureaucratic interests (e.g., of the 
navy and specific factions within it); and fourth, a desire within the leadership 
for a Chinese “Great White Fleet” for international prestige. It is likely that a 
combination of these factors provides the impetus behind China’s naval mod-
ernization. However, oil supply security stands out as a clear national strategic 
interest that has the potential to unite factions within China in support of more 
assertive naval policies.
China’s growing reliance on oil imports to power economic growth makes oil 
supply security a distinct national security interest. In an attempt to transform 
Hu’s general guidance into more specific policy, articles in state and military 
media have argued that to safeguard China’s economic growth, the PLA must 
go beyond its previous mission of safeguarding national “survival interests” (生
存利益) to protecting national “development interests” (发展利益). “Our eco-
nomic development generates the need of overseas resources and markets, and 
there are hidden dangers in the security of our development,” explains a Nanjing 
Army Command College political commissar, Major General Tian Bingren. 
“With the deepening of economic globalization and increasingly frequent 
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flow of . . . energy sources, an outside local war or conflict will influence the 
development and construction of a country.”33 Writing in a PLA newspaper, the 
recently retired Major General Peng Guangqian—who has served as a research 
fellow at China’s Academy of Military Sciences and who, as an adviser to China’s 
powerful Central Military Commission (CMC) and Politburo Standing Com-
mittee, has enjoyed significant influence in the shaping of PLA strategy—warns 
that “some of the foreign hostile 
forces” may “control the transport 
hubs and important sea routes 
for China to keep contact with 
the outside, and curb the lifeline 
China needs to develop.”34 A major 
study advised by such influential 
policy makers as Dr. Qiu Yanping, 
deputy director of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee’s National 
Security Leading Small Group Office,35 emphasizes the importance of securing 
China’s sea lines of communication.36 Writing in the official journal of the Cen-
tral Committee, the PLAN commander, Wu Shengli, and Political Commissar 
Hu Yanlin state, “To maintain the safety of the oceanic transportation and the 
strategic passageway for energy and resources . . . we must build a powerful 
navy.”37 While this serves these individuals’ bureaucratic interests, they must 
nevertheless coordinate their statements with PLA and CCP leadership; such 
naval advocacy would have been impermissible previously. Analysts writing in 
PLA publications label oil security a key area of concern and advocate measures, 
including expansion of strategic petroleum reserves and modernization of the 
PLA Navy and Air Force, as well as of the Second Artillery (the strategic missile 
force), in order to protect China’s energy supplies and key infrastructure.38
A series of naval strategy books, published in Beijing during 2003 by a PLAN-
affiliated press, under the overarching theme of “The Chinese Nation and the 
Ocean,” suggests a relatively firm link between naval strategy and resource con-
cerns among serious Chinese analysts. The introduction to one of these books, 
蓝色方略 (The Blue Strategy), explains that “in today’s world, the population is 
growing as land-based resources are depleted. Conflict and competition over 
maritime rights and interests are intensifying with each passing day.”39 Another 
book in the series, 卫海强军 (A Mighty Force to Protect the Sea), suggests that 
resource issues will greatly affect China’s development trajectory. Resolving this 
issue in a manner that supports China’s development strategy will require new 
“resource space” (资源空间) that can only be found in maritime domains.40 
Alfred Thayer Mahan’s dicta that commerce is vital to maritime power and 
that the best way to threaten and defend commerce is by engaging naval forces in 
“[China] must view things from the perspec-
tive of keeping the United States from cutting 
its oil supply lines. Concretely speaking, this 
entails making the United States not willing to 
cut China’s oil supply lines, not daring to do so, 
and not able to do so.”
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decisive battle are pervasive in Chinese writings.41 They appear in a recent book, 
海上力量与中华民族的伟大复兴 (Sea Power and the Chinese Nation’s Mighty 
Resurgence), by two Chinese naval officers.42 Published by China’s National De-
fense University, the volume emphasizes the critical role of controlling sea-lanes 
for the purposes of developing sea power, as well as the nation’s economy. Its 
authors contend that sea powers have generally enjoyed great geostrategic ad-
vantages over land powers—an argument with major implications for China’s 
future development. Once again stressing the link between economic and naval 
power, the two naval officers note, “from an economic power standpoint, mari-
time civilizations . . . are far superior to continental civilizations.” Of particular 
relevance to this discussion of oil security, the authors observe that continental 
powers have frequently been surrounded and blockaded with considerable stra-
tegic effect. They suggest that maritime threats to China are increasing and that 
its maritime resources are being plundered. 
The recent actions of the United States have exerted an especially deep influ-
ence on Chinese analysts’ oil security views. According to a 2004 article on oil 
security in China’s foremost naval journal, Modern Navy, “The 9.11 events gave 
the United States an opportunity to assert greater control over the oil-rich Mid-
dle East. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq ensured that Middle Eastern oil and 
gas was ‘in the bag’ for the United States.” The author of this analysis argues: 
“The great powers compete for oil [because whichever state] controls the oil 
can also control the lifeblood of other countries’ economic development, [but 
whichever state] controls the Middle East can control that of the [entire] world 
economy.”43 Such perceptions are important. If Chinese policy makers see the oil 
market as United States–controlled and unreliable and come to doubt Washing-
ton’s willingness to keep critical oil SLOCs open impartially, they might push 
hard to create a blue-water navy. Such actions would mark a strategic tipping 
point in the Sino-American relationship and could set off a cascade effect of 
more assertive SLOC security policies by Japan and other major oil importers.
ChineSe viewS of oil SloCS
Chinese defense policy intellectuals generally consider oil SLOC security to be 
a major issue, as suggested by an edited volume on SLOC and maritime oil se-
curity published by China Institute of Contemporary International Relations 
(CICIR).44 In addition, the PLA’s first English-language volume of its type, The 
Science of Military Strategy, emphasizes that SLOC security is vital to China’s 
long-term development.45 As discussed above, the authors of Chinese oil secu-
rity works tend to fall into two primary camps: the “free marketeers,” who see 
the global oil market as the best guarantor of oil supply security, and the “mer-
cantilists,” who see the global oil supply situation in zero-sum terms and favor 
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greater state involvement in securing energy supplies. Those who believe that 
greater reliance on the international oil market is the best path to oil supply 
security have gained strength over the past several years. However, based on as-
sessment of Chinese-language analyses on oil supply security, it appears that the 
mercantilists still exert significant influence. More to the point, authors close 
to the military and to the party’s top ranks appear to have strong mercantilist 
inclinations. Accordingly, that the mercantilists’ articles occupy less print space 
relative to those of free marketeers does not necessarily mean that their policy 
influence is insignificant. 
In fact, the upswing in Somali piracy in late 2008 and the pirates’ capture 
and holding for three months of the supertanker Sirius Star have likely strength-
ened the hand of those favoring a more assertive naval presence along key mari-
time energy transit corridors. The PLA Navy’s subsequent deployment of two 
destroyers and a supply ship to the Gulf of Aden is an unprecedented move that 
may presage a more active Chinese presence near global maritime energy routes. 
At the very least, it will make China’s energy diplomacy much more credible, 
given that it demonstrates a capability to deploy military assets in areas of inter-
est. The following section surveys Chinese strategic thinkers’ views as to which 
regions are most crucial to Chinese energy security.
China’s modern strategists envision their nation as having four strategic sea-
lanes: east (from across the Pacific), south (from Australia and the Pacific is-
lands), west (from the Middle East and East Africa through the Indian Ocean), 
and north (through Sea of Okhotsk and the Tsushima Strait). They worry that 
more than 75 percent of China’s seaborne oil imports flow through a few key 
maritime arteries.46 Chinese analysts and policy makers discuss possible ways to 
bypass these established routes, but thus far few of their plans appear likely to 
alter substantially China’s dependence on established global oil shipping lanes. 
Seaborne oil transport tends to be far less expensive than pipelines, for in-
stance. In addition, the majority of China’s oil imports come from the Middle 
East and Africa, where distance and geographic obstacles (oceans) make pipe-
line shipments economically and physically unfeasible. According to a map that 
appeared in the October 2006 issue of 现代舰船 (Modern Ships), such alter-
native routes could ultimately include oil pipelines from Siberia, Pakistan, the 
Burmese port of Sittwe, and the just-completed Kazakhstan pipeline that carries 
oil into western China. The accompanying analysis, however, is skeptical that 
these pipelines could solve China’s “Malacca Problem.” Regarding Russia, for 
example, it is suggested that Moscow’s evident distrust of China means that the 
Kremlin “will not accept putting its lifeline under the control of another great 
power.”47 Chinese analysts worry that Russia might suspend oil supplies dur-
ing crisis; they realize that their Russian counterparts worry that in peacetime 
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China might import additional oil by sea and refuse Russian oil shipments un-
less it received lower prices. On the other hand, CICIR scholar Zhang Xuegang 
maintains optimistically that a proposed canal across Thailand’s Isthmus of Kra 
“could . . . provide a strategic seaway to the Chinese navy” through which “fleets 
could . . . more easily protect the nearby sea-lanes and gain access to the Indian 
Ocean.”48 
It is generally held that land-based oil pipelines can displace a portion of 
future oil import growth and will help diversify China’s oil import channels 
to some extent but that they cannot replace maritime oil transport.49 Available 
overland supplies from Russia, Kazakhstan, and other areas are insufficient to 
reduce China’s growing absolute and relative reliance on seaborne oil imports. 
Furthermore, off-loading seaborne crude in Burma or Pakistan seems problem-
atic, given their great distances from China’s coastal economic centers. Moreover, 
as a few Chinese sources recognize, pipelines have their own vulnerabilities—to 
substate actors and precision-guided munitions.50 An article in 舰船知识 (Naval 
and Merchant Ships) states succinctly, “SLOC security is much more important 
than pipeline transport lines.”51 It is therefore reasonable to assume that China 
will continue to rely on the Indian Ocean sea-lanes, the Malacca and Hormuz 
straits, and the South and East China seas as its primary oil import channels.52
Chinese writers have dubbed the Strait of Hormuz the “Oil Strait” (石油海
峡), because China obtains approximately 40–45 percent of its oil imports from 
the Middle East, the vast majority of which must flow through Hormuz.53 Chi-
nese scholars recognize the Middle East’s instability, noting that since 1951 ten 
of the sixteen major global oil supply disruptions have originated in the region.54 
A recent PRC analysis notes that by 2020 China could be importing nearly four 
million barrels per day of oil from the Middle East (over twice the current aver-
age level of 1.5 million barrels per day).55 Chinese experts note pointedly that 
“all oil that China imports from the Middle East and Africa has to go through 
the Straits of Hormuz and Malacca, but [these straits] are beyond the reach of 
the PLAN’s power.”56 
The “Western SLOC” (西行航线), running from the Indian Ocean through 
the Malacca Strait, to the South China Sea, and finally to the Chinese mainland, 
has particular strategic value as “China’s ‘lifeline’ of economic development.”57 
It carries 80 percent of Chinese oil imports;58 that figure includes virtually all 
of China’s imports from the Middle East and Africa.59 Chinese researchers fear 
that Malacca, which “has become the strategic throat of China’s energy and eco-
nomic security,” is “extremely narrow, easy to blockade.”60 “Whoever controls 
the Strait of Malacca,” therefore, “effectively grips China’s strategic energy pas-
sage, and can threaten China’s energy security at any time.”61 
10
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Chinese specialists are therefore particularly sensitive to the growth of Amer-
ican influence in and around the Strait of Malacca. Chinese writings do mention 
piracy and terrorism as threats to the oil flow through Malacca, noting that “in 
2001 alone, there were over 600 piracy incidents.”62 The foremost concern of 
many, however, is clearly the strong U.S. presence in the region, which has 
increased with the ongoing war on terror. There is little doubt that the situation in 
the contemporary Middle East has made an impression: whichever state “controls 
the Middle East can control . . . the [entire] world economy.”63 Chinese observers 
scrutinize what they regard as an American choke point control strategy, stating: 
“Everyone knows that the Malacca Strait is tightly linked to the South China Sea 
. . . and grips the throat of both the Pacific and the Indian Oceans.”64
One PRC analysis asks whether the Malacca Strait will become yet another 
American forward military position in the Asia-Pacific.65 Another asserts that 
the United States poses a “grave, hidden threat” to China’s energy security.66 
PRC scholars have noted that in 1992 the Seventh Fleet’s logistics agent, Com-
mander, Logistics Group Western Pacific, was moved from Subic Bay in the 
Philippines to Singapore.67 The United States has no military base there, only 
access to facilities like Changi Naval Base, but, it is suggested, “the area can be 
placed under the control of U.S. military power.”68 China is uneasy with grow-
ing U.S.-Singapore security cooperation and the notion that the United States 
appears to be cementing its regional strategic position under the guise of “com-
bating terrorism.”69 
The South China Sea is another of China’s critical oil transport zones, as China-
bound oil flowing through Malacca must also transit this area on its way to 
southern and eastern China.70 The South China Sea is, moreover, a vital trans-
port corridor for liquefied natural gas (LNG), carrying two-thirds of the world’s 
current LNG trade.71 At present, Japan and South Korea are the region’s primary 
LNG users, but the LNG transport security question is of increasing interest 
to China, which by 2020 may be importing more than thirty million tons per 
year.72
At the same time, China is keenly interested in producing oil and gas from 
beneath the South China Sea. Some Chinese observers claim that the South Chi-
na Sea represents a “second Persian Gulf.”73 Two naval analysts assert that “oil 
and gas reserves [of the South China Sea] could reach 3.5 billion tons [or more 
than twenty-five billion barrels of oil equivalent] . . . [which would be] extremely 
important for China’s economic development.”74 A PLA publication also claims 
that the South China Sea possesses “rich oil reserves equivalent to those of the 
Middle East.”75 Such assertions, however, are not supported by the limited oil 
yield from the South China Sea over thirty years of exploration and appear di-
vorced from the far lower reserves that international oil companies believe to be 
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present there. Figure 1 lists the top global oil and gas reserve zones, according to 
a widely accepted industry benchmark. 
If Chinese researchers’ reserve estimates appear wildly optimistic, they do 
suggest that Beijing greatly values the South China Sea’s oil and gas production 
potential. This could assume particular importance if China increases explora-
tion and production activities there to reduce oil and gas import dependence, 
and thereby vulnerability to SLOC disruption. If Chinese national oil compa-
nies find oil or gas in the South China Sea, even outside China’s territorial wa-
ters or exclusive economic zone, SLOC vulnerability would be reduced substan-
tially by the shift of oil assets to be defended from the far reaches of the Indian 
Ocean to areas increasingly within range of China’s air and naval bases. To date, 
the South China Sea appears to be yielding much more natural gas than oil. 
In collaboration with China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), for 
instance, Hong Kong–based Husky Resources in 2006 made a world-class four-
to-six-trillion-cubic-foot gas discovery 250 kilometers south of Hong Kong.76 
Like the South China Sea, the East China Sea has attracted the interest of 
Chinese specialists because of its oil resources, the value of which they like-
wise seem to exaggerate. “The East China Sea’s continental shelf could be one 
of the world’s richest oil fields,” declares a book by two PLAN officers. “The 
waters near the [disputed] Diaoyu [/Senkaku] Islands could become the ‘Sec-
ond Middle East.’”77 The East China Sea is typically mentioned in the context of 
energy and territorial disputes with Japan, as opposed to SLOC security per se. 
Nevertheless, it contains some of China’s most important ports, and, unlike the 
Malacca Strait and Indian Ocean oil lanes (but like the South China Sea), it lies 
fIgure 1
glOBal OIl aNd gaS reServeS By regION
Source: “Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2008,” British Petroleum, www.bp.com.
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near Chinese air and naval bases. The next section will explore which threats 
Chinese analysts fear most and under which scenarios they might arise.
perCeived ThreaTS To China’S major oil SloC
It is often said that American naval supremacy is an excellent guarantor of 
global SLOC security and that Beijing actually benefits substantially from the 
stabilizing role that American naval hegemony plays.78 This is perhaps especially 
true with respect to oil markets and the related question of sea-lane security.79 
But Chinese naval and maritime analysts tend to focus on what might happen 
to Chinese seaborne oil supplies during a conflict, and they generally perceive 
a substantial naval threat to China’s oil SLOCs. One representative writing ob-
serves that oil and gas supply routes often become important military targets 
in wartime: “Japanese tankers became Allied targets and in 1944, Japanese oil 
imports were halved. By early 1945, Japanese oil imports had basically been 
stopped.”80 It should be noted that in assessing the threats to China’s major oil 
SLOC, Chinese specialists contend that this threat does not emanate solely from 
Washington. 
Despite the pathbreaking bilateral exercises with the Indian navy in 2005 
and Hu Jintao’s successful November 2006 visit to India, Chinese observ-
ers worry about India’s dominant position astride China’s most important oil 
SLOC. Chinese naval and maritime affairs publications keenly follow Indian 
naval development;81 they are impressed by this development, especially in the 
realm of naval aviation, and fear that such capabilities could allow New Delhi 
to “effectively prevent any outside great power’s Navy from entering the Indian 
Ocean.”82 Moreover, Chinese observers also note India’s enhanced ability to 
project power to the east. Indeed, a 2004 article in Modern Ships reviews New 
Delhi’s establishment over the past decade of a Far Eastern Fleet (远东舰队), its 
growing operational presence in the Andaman Sea and the Malacca Strait area, 
and increased exercises with the U.S. Navy.83 Perceiving an emerging threat to 
a vital SLOC, one Chinese expert observes that the 75 percent of Chinese oil 
imports oil coming from Africa and the Middle East must pass through Indian 
navy–controlled seas.84 
According to another Chinese observer, it is the fleets of the United States, 
Japan, and India that, together, “invariably constitute overwhelming pressure 
on China’s oil supply.”85 In appraising Japan’s newly evolving defense posture, 
Chinese researchers express concern that “Japan’s defense scope has extended to 
the Taiwan Strait and could include the Malacca Strait. [Also,] Japan has used 
Singapore’s air bases.”86 Other naval specialists have been critical of Japan’s de-
ployment to Iraq, arguing that this initiative has more to do with the geopolitics 
of oil than with any humanitarian motives.87 This illustrates a larger concern 
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that the regional maritime oil security environment is being reshaped to Bei-
jing’s detriment.
Nevertheless, as a recent maritime oil security assessment in Modern Ships 
states, “For the foreseeable future, the U.S., Japan, and India are the three coun-
tries that have the capability to cut China’s oil supply lines. However, cutting 
China’s oil supply lines essentially 
means starting a war with China. 
. . . Only the U.S. has the power 
and the nerve to blockade China’s 
oil transport routes.” The same 
Chinese naval analysis suggests 
two possible scenarios wherein 
the United States might seek to 
embargo China’s oil supplies. The first would be a Taiwan contingency. The sec-
ond is less clear: “If China’s rise is not of a peaceful character, or if the speed of 
the rise is too rapid . . . the U.S. could blockade China’s maritime oil transport 
lines, thereby cutting short China’s rise.” It is argued that, in addition to the 
Malacca Strait, American forces could block China’s energy SLOC at multiple 
points. This prospect is interpreted as a source of considerable leverage for the 
U.S. Navy vis-à-vis China.88 Another analysis arrives at similarly stark conclu-
sions, stating that the 1993 Yinhe incident (frequently invoked by Chinese an-
alysts) could foreshadow American interception of China-bound oil shipping 
during a Taiwan crisis.89 
One of the most interesting naval strategy discussions regarding the threat to 
China’s oil SLOC concerns Taiwan. Most PRC analyses of the Taiwan question 
tend to focus on the official line that Taiwan is fundamentally a sovereignty 
issue. By contrast, the book 戍海固边 (Defend the Sea, Strengthen Frontiers) fo-
cuses on the strategic value of the island for China. Its authors assert that the 
Taiwan issue is a matter of survival for China, because control of the island will 
enable mainland China to “project [naval power] upon the Pacific Ocean’s criti-
cal strategic sea lanes.” Its authors suggest that unfavorable geography, especially 
the enemy’s position on Taiwan, has enabled adversaries to blockade China in 
the recent past. According to this analysis, Taiwan is critically positioned along 
the “oil route” from the Middle East to East Asia. It is suggested, moreover, that 
“if Taiwan fell under the control of a power hostile to China, not only would 
this mean that this great gate was closed but also that the Taiwan Strait Channel 
could be blocked.”90
Chinese naval and maritime analysts are well aware that the U.S., Indian, 
and, especially, Japanese economies are also highly dependent on seaborne trade 
in oil and gas. One Chinese interlocutor has even suggested that at least in the 
“A big and powerful [Chinese] fleet will sup-
port a stable supply chain [from which] all oil 
trading nations benefit. Thus, in the era of glo-
balization, a formidable navy is not only in our 
own country’s security interest, but is actually 
a requirement of global security as well.”
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near term China’s only viable naval response to the aforementioned embargo 
scenarios would be a strategy of retaliation—an effort to answer an embargo 
against China with “an eye for an eye.”91 The implication during the interview 
was that China could interrupt U.S. oil supplies if Washington attempted to 
blockade China, but no specific methods were mentioned.
plan requiremenTS for proTeCTing mariTime  
oil Supply rouTeS
As noted previously, Chinese writings that examine energy and oil supply 
security issues have become increasingly available in recent years. Still, very 
few publicly available sources contain detailed discussions of SLOC security 
missions and the tactics and platforms that such missions might require. It is 
useful to examine some of those that do. 
战役理论学习指南 (Campaign Theory Study Guide), a 2001 textbook written 
by Chinese National Defense University scholars, draws on a variety of high-
quality doctrinal publications. Its authors believe that air and information supe-
riority will be necessary to achieve sea control, using such offensive operations 
as “raids on enemy bases or harbors and other major coastal targets; operations 
to annihilate enemy force concentrations on the water; ocean blockades; opera-
tions to disrupt enemy ocean transportation; and operations to take islands or 
shoals,” as well as defensive measures, including “defense of straits and water-
ways, protecting ocean transportation lines and counter blockade operations.”92 
To safeguard its own ocean transport, the PLAN may have to “annihilate enemy 
heavy naval groups . . . and . . . destroy the enemy ocean transport and supply 
system.” The range of the PLAN will be an important determinant of opera-
tional success: “Offshore combat stresses that the front lines of the first island 
chain is a primary battlefield for our offshore waters which should be seized and 
held to our advantage.”
Should China implement a naval blockade, the authors acknowledge, inter-
national law will impose constraints, though they believe such targets as enemy 
offshore oil zones to be legitimate. To attack an enemy SLOC the authors rec-
ommend selecting an accessible section of the ones least protected but most fre-
quently used. Distant enemy bases, which are heavily fortified but fixed, could 
be destroyed, preferably by a preemptive strike. 
Regarding “coastal SLOC defense,” the authors believe that China enjoys “nu-
merous forms of superiority such as weather, topography, and a friendly popu-
lation.” Based on PLAN requirements, elements of the PLA and “sea militias, 
sea transport, and the fishing industry,” they propose, should navigate in small 
groups “between islands and through maritime areas that are inconvenient for 
submarines and large surface vessels.” Notwithstanding the high defensibility of 
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coastal waters, infrastructure improvements are making them less important to 
China’s oil security. China is rapidly improving its domestic pipeline network 
for transporting crude oil and products and is thereby is becoming less reliant 
on coastal shipping to move petroleum from point to point.
Chinese strategists are rather more concerned that an enemy could interdict 
China-bound tankers far from PRC shores. As Campaign Theory Study Guide 
notes, “During deep-sea SLOC defense combat, the loss of superior coastal con-
ditions and the presence of numerous disadvantageous factors mean that the 
threat from enemy transportation disrupting forces is great.” Limitations in-
clude “relatively low integrated mobility, less desirable reconnaissance and early-
warning capacity, and limited maritime control area, which make it difficult for 
us to discover the enemy’s forces in a timely manner.” 
To make the best of a difficult situation, the PLAN should employ “large 
group concentrations” to attack enemy ships taking on fuel and supplies, tran-
siting “narrow waterways,” particularly during inclement weather, and “stick 
close to the coasts of friendly countries,” perhaps aided by “diplomatic short-
cuts.” As in coastal SLOC defense, forces should operate in unexpected areas 
and prepare both “reserve” and “decoy” routes. In addition to “moderniz[ing] 
and refit[ing] destroyers, escorts, and conventional submarines,” “outfitting 
transport vessels with certain weapons and helicopters and having them con-
duct necessary warning, anti-submarine, anti-vessel, and other self-defense 
combat has a certain technological superiority over the use of guard vessels.” 
To improve deep-sea SLOC protection in the future, China should “endeavor to 
establish a contemporary, integrated and offensive, new, special mixed fleet with 
an aircraft carrier as core and missile destroyers (or cruisers) and nuclear attack 
submarines as backbone forces.”
战役学 (The Science of Campaigns), an operationally and tactically focused 
doctrinal textbook, was also published by China’s National Defense Universi-
ty.93 The 2006 version devotes considerable focus to joint operations and the 
specific measures necessary to support offensive operations in order to deter 
other militaries from threatening China’s SLOCs, or, failing that, to retaliate 
and compel them to retreat. Chapter 12, “Joint Blockade Campaign,” empha-
sizes the need to achieve objectives rapidly in a complex battle environment by 
jointly implementing an air, maritime, and information blockade.94 The last en-
tails “actively destroy[ing] the enemy’s important ground information instal-
lations, disrupt[ing] the enemy’s satellite and radio channels, cut[ting] off the 
enemy’s submarine cables and cable channels . . . [and] smashing the enemy’s 
information warfare capability.” In order to “achieve and maintain campaign 
sea control,” the PLA should “establish an integrated air and sea monitoring and 
controlling system.” China’s “Air Force, conventional missile forces, submarine 
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forces and surface combat ship force” should implement “barrier” (e.g., sea 
mine), “firepower,” and “armed force” blockades on the enemy’s naval ports 
and bases.
This emerging doctrine’s focus on how to ensure the security of the sea-lanes 
adjacent to China’s coast in a conflict over Taiwan against the attempts of states 
to blockade China (as opposed to securing SLOCs in peacetime) seem to suggest 
that China would consider preemptive action to protect its sea-lanes and that it 
would not hesitate to escalate in order to protect maritime resource supply lines. 
These doctrinal writings also suggest present limitations in PLAN capabilities: 
they reveal an apparent need for improvised and stopgap measures to achieve 
such goals in actual combat conditions. Even after a decade of intensive naval 
modernization, many of the ideas suggested remain aspirational rather than op-
erationally feasible. These statements need to be compared with those in other 
PLAN doctrinal writings as they become available outside China; nonetheless, 
it seems reasonable to conclude that Beijing nearly a decade ago was already 
carefully evaluating the consequences of, and potential countermeasures to, a 
maritime oil blockade. As new doctrine imposes new requirements, this will 
highlight capabilities and limitations, thereby clarifying further the extent and 
direction of the PLAN’s SLOC security efforts.
naval impliCaTionS: Beyond Taiwan?
China might also be pursuing the ability to project naval power further than 
would be necessary in a Taiwan contingency. Modern warships are capable of 
performing many missions. Hence, they are not restricted to a specific role in 
specific waters. Their political masters presumably find them useful to perform 
a variety of missions in a wide range of circumstances and locations (e.g., both 
a Taiwan context and deployments farther afield). One explanation for China’s 
possible movement toward a blue-water navy that might transcend the Taiwan 
issue is found in its growing dependence on imported oil and other key eco-
nomic inputs. 
The PLAN’s present inability to secure China’s long-distance oil transport 
SLOCs, or to deter a U.S. blockade militarily, greatly concerns Chinese experts.95 
They are painfully aware of the U.S. Navy’s superiority over the PLAN.96 There is 
a clear sense of urgency: “Regarding the problems . . . of sea embargo or oil lanes 
being cut off . . . . China must . . . ‘repair the house before it rains.’”97 
One PRC naval analysis of maritime rights and resource security explains that 
China’s navy is not sufficiently strong to undertake the oil-SLOC security mis-
sion, because of Beijing’s longtime policy of “emphasizing land power over sea 
power” (重陆轻海).98 This policy stems from the fact that for much of its history 
China faced land-based threats from what is now Central Asia and Mongolia, as 
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well as internal security concerns. Threats from the sea did not become a ma-
jor issue until the arrival of European forces in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, and China did not come to depend significantly on seaborne natural 
resource imports until 1993, when it became a net oil importer.99 Hinting at 
a possible redirection of PLAN strategy, as well as at potential rivalry among 
PLAN warfare communities, the above-mentioned analysis advocates shifting 
priorities from a submarine-centric navy to one with aircraft carriers as the 
“centerpiece.”100 
Such a shift would have major internal and international implications. Inter-
nally, it would mean that the PLAN would likely capture a much larger portion of 
the defense budget, especially as the carriers themselves would need a comple-
ment of aircraft and a dedicated fleet of escort vessels to be useful in actual 
combat conditions. Its internal clout would be further enhanced by the fact that 
aircraft carriers might rapidly become an important diplomatic instrument for 
projecting Chinese presence and influence in Asia, and perhaps (eventually) 
globally. Internationally, moving toward a carrier-centric navy could prompt 
other regional and global navies to upgrade their own forces in anticipation of 
China’s taking a more assertive stance regarding naval power projection.
Despite any efforts both to channel China’s maritime development in a peace-
ful direction and to portray it accordingly to the rest of the world, history sug-
gests that any major military modernization program is likely to unnerve other 
powers. A move by Beijing from a “near sea” to a “blue water” naval strategy, even 
if conducted under the auspices of “commercial protection,” may be no different. 
A recent article in 中国军事科学 (China Military Science) states that “[China’s] 
navy must . . . unceasingly move toward [the posture of] a ‘blue-water navy’ 
[and] expand the scope of maritime strategic defense.”101 To accomplish this goal, 
one Chinese analyst asserts that Beijing requires long-range area-air-defense de-
stroyers, helicopter carriers, diesel submarines with air-independent propulsion 
and cruise missiles, nuclear submarines capable of attacking enemy harbors and 
land targets, and advanced naval aircraft, such as the Su-30 Flanker.102 
Proponents of energy/SLOC defense as a mission for the PLAN are not the 
only ones contributing to what seems to have become a robust debate within 
China. Some Chinese views acknowledge the costs and difficulty of building 
the power-projection capabilities necessary to carry out credible SLOC-defense 
missions (e.g., aircraft carriers), as well as the potential for balancing against 
China and the political costs that would likely occur in the event that China 
procured a carrier battle group. Many writers express similar or related reserva-
tions, either directly or indirectly. The presence of these views within China may 
help explain why the arguments for energy/SLOC-defense missions have not yet 
gained greater traction. 
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poTenTial indiCaTorS of a ShifT To oil SeCuriTy aS a naval 
developmenT driver 
Chinese writings suggest a range of views on how to organize the PLAN for op-
erations further afield. A sustained movement of assets to the South China Sea 
could imply a PLAN mission beyond Taiwan, in pursuit of genuine, if limited, 
SLOC protection capability. Indeed, a student at Beijing’s influential Central 
Party School asserts that China has been overly cautious in its naval develop-
ment and should instead pursue a navy capable of deterring SLOC attacks all 
the way to Malacca and of conducting combat operations beyond a thousand 
nautical miles from China.103 Increased PLAN presence in key SLOC areas could 
also have a valuable “shaping” function, as it can “strengthen [China’s] power 
of influence in key sea areas and straits” in peacetime and thereby decrease the 
chance of its interests being threatened in war. 104
One of the most ambitious discussions of PLAN development in relation 
to energy SLOC security is found in a 2006 article from 舰载武器 (Shipborne 
Weapons). This article proposes that in the twenty-first century, as China broad-
ens its naval presence on the world’s oceans, Beijing’s North, East, and South 
Sea fleets should transform into a Northern Fleet, a Pacific Fleet, and an “Indian 
Ocean Fleet” (印度样舰队). A systematic outline of the potential scope and mis-
sion of such notional Northern and Pacific fleets is beyond the parameters of 
the present article. Nonetheless, we can observe that the very idea of a Chinese 
Indian Ocean Fleet, while speculative, could suggest the potential for significant 
change in the PLAN’s response to the SLOC security issue. According to this 
Chinese analysis, the core mission of the proposed Indian Ocean Fleet would be 
“to protect [Beijing’s] interests in the South China Sea, while at the same time 
guarding the Indian Ocean navigation route and escorting Chinese oil tank-
ers transiting the Malacca Strait.” The analysis emphasizes the crucial role that 
aircraft carriers would play in such a fleet, particularly if they could coordinate 
effectively with China’s new air defense destroyers.105 
Were China to move toward a robust blue-water SLOC-defense capability, 
the evidence of its doing so would likely emerge, sequentially, in, first, adoption 
of the logic and the language of the proponents’ arguments in major speech-
es; followed by, second, formal changes to published doctrines and published 
guidelines; third, in a shift in acquisitions and procurement; and fourth, a shift 
in such areas as deployment and training. A major speech might be made by a 
senior civilian leader (e.g., on the Politburo Standing Committee) that adopted 
some of the language outlined by some of the proponents described above. Ad-
justments to doctrine would likely be published prior to the actual acquisition 
of capabilities. This general PLA pattern is exemplified by Jiang Zemin’s 1993 
speech on “military strategic guidelines,” which presaged later acquisitions and 
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changes to operational doctrine.106 Of course, if the PLAN acquired certain ca-
pabilities for SLOC defense but doctrine and the majority of procurement, de-
ployment, and training remained focused on other missions, then it would seem 
that a transition had still not occurred.
While logical in practice, however, this sequence might be difficult to moni-
tor. Chinese doctrine and policy statements are often vague, and they might be 
deliberately obfuscated in order to minimize the scope for balancing behavior by 
other powers. Larger precipitating developments, such as a bureaucratic change 
that enhanced the PLAN’s status or budgetary resources, might occur without 
foreshadowing obvious to the outside world. Even deployment and training can 
be ambiguous; PLA experts have recommended using missions other than war 
(e.g., anti-piracy efforts off Somalia) to develop war-fighting capabilities and 
interoperability.107 Hardware acquisition and deployment, by contrast, is a use-
ful indicator to monitor, because it is typically less ambiguous. With respect to 
force structure, indicators of a more ambitious Chinese naval presence, particu-
larly in the area of SLOC protection, would likely include:
Construction and deployment of additional nuclear attack submarines and ••
other platforms with significant demonstrated antisubmarine warfare  
capabilities108
Development of aircraft or helicopter carriers and related doctrine and train-••
ing programs109
Establishment of new, modern shipyards dedicated to military ship produc-••
tion or expansion of areas in coproduction yards that are dedicated to mili-
tary ship production110
Expansion of the PLAN auxiliary fleet, particularly long-range, high-speed ••
oilers and replenishment ships
Development of the ability to conduct sophisticated ship repairs remotely, ••
either through tenders or overseas repair facilities111 
Steady deployment of PLAN forces to vulnerable portions of the sea-lanes to ••
increase operational familiarity and readiness
Maturation of advanced levels of PLA doctrine, training, and human capital.••
Perhaps the most important indicator, however, would be Chinese acquisi-
tion of reliable overseas air and naval bases—a major shift from current foreign-
policy doctrine. China is already bolstering its strategic position along Indian 
Ocean oil SLOCs. Writing in China Military Science, a PLAN senior captain 
details Chinese investments in Burmese and Pakistani port facilities (e.g., Gwa-
dar) that would improve western and southwestern China’s sea access and also 
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expand China’s geostrategic influence.112 Gwadar has been designed in part to 
“serve as an alternate port to handle Pakistani trade in case of blockade of exist-
ing ports,” however, and Pakistan might be reluctant to grant the PLAN access 
during a conflict.113 
Perhaps the PLA is making greater progress in Burma, where it has report-
edly assisted in the construction of several naval facilities on the Bay of Bengal. 
A Chinese Southeast Asia expert notes that Sino-Burmese military and security 
relations have strengthened, with China assisting in the construction and mod-
ernization of Burmese naval bases by repairing and constructing radars and fuel 
facilities. Burma’s leaders, he claims, have pledged to support China if it needs 
to defend its interests.114
Despite these reports, however, China appears far from having overseas naval 
bases of its own. An Indian naval officer, Commander Gurpreet Khurana, as-
sesses, “China and the IOR [Indian Ocean Region] countries involved maintain 
that the transport infrastructure being built is purely for commercial use. There 
is no decisive evidence at this point to assert otherwise because these facilities 
are in nascent stages of development.”115 In the future, any bases that China did 
establish would have to be defended effectively in the event of conflict.
a reSponSiBle STakeholder?
It is perhaps not surprising that Chinese naval and maritime affairs analysts 
are looking to “blue water” missions beyond the strict confines of Taiwan con-
tingencies. It is certainly in their bureaucratic interest to do so. Indeed, such 
bureaucratic interests have fueled previous naval rivalries. Of course, it is also 
possible that official approval of planning, budget, and forces for explicit SLOC 
security missions might promote factional disagreement because of the cost and 
the potential for negative international repercussions. China’s national oil com-
panies, which shape much of China’s oil and gas policy, may prefer the status 
quo. The State Council and other bureaucratic organs are committed to vital 
domestic development priorities that include the foremost challenges confront-
ing China’s leadership (welfare, health care, urbanization, west and northeast 
development, and rural modernization). The army, air force, and Second Ar-
tillery may have different priorities for defense-spending allocation. Moreover, 
the foreign ministry and even top leaders share an understanding about the po-
tential for balancing against China if Beijing appears too aggressive. Neverthe-
less, continued development of China’s economy may make available sufficient 
resources to permit “logrolling,” in which different organizations and policy 
factions acquiesce to the fulfillment of others’ budgetary priorities in return for 
support for their own.116 Continued substantial increases in the PLA budget as 
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a whole, and even improvements in the PLAN’s ability to compete with China’s 
other armed services, cannot be ruled out.
A more surprising finding is that a number of Chinese maritime and naval 
specialists support maritime cooperation with the other oil-consuming powers, 
particularly the United States. Some Chinese analysts recognize the potential 
costs to China of a balancing reaction, by neighbors and the United States, to 
a Chinese shift toward an extended SLOC-defense mission for the PLAN. Key 
strategic implications that could destabilize the Indian Ocean and western Pa-
cific littoral regions might include regional naval power upgrades and alliance 
rebalancing to offset a more muscular and far-ranging Chinese naval presence. 
A unilateral approach is unnecessary, some write, and the costs would be very 
great. India, Japan, the United States, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Australia would 
almost certainly bolster their own naval forces and would also likely seek to cre-
ate security architectures more explicitly designed to contain China. 
A major study of China’s SLOC security problem calls for emphasizing coop-
eration in international organizations and conventions and in laws and regula-
tions concerning oil transport.117 A 2004 survey in Naval and Merchant Ships 
reveals many nationalist themes on energy but concludes that China is “increas-
ingly dependent on stability in the Middle East.”118 Of course, such language 
sounds entirely familiar to Western ears. An analysis from Modern Ships finds 
that “the energy crisis and maritime SLOC security are not problems that are 
just confronting China alone . . . but [rather] impact on international SLOC 
security and stability.”119 A more recent analysis from the same journal observes 
that Persian Gulf instability could harm China’s interests significantly; it argues 
that China must cooperate closely with India, South Korea, and even Japan—
which might otherwise join the United States against China in any conflict—in 
the energy sphere.120 But the overarching requirement is to maintain good rela-
tions with Washington. There is little choice, according to this source, because 
“the U.S. could blockade energy shipments to China at any time.” It is suggested, 
moreover, that present U.S.-China relations have stabilized to a large degree, 
despite the UNOCAL incident and other irritants.121 It is also recognized that 
Washington is unlikely to act against the status quo. In fact, “if stability can be 
maintained in U.S.-China relations, then China’s maritime oil transport will be 
basically secure.” 
On a similar note, CICIR scholar Zhao Hongtu writes that while oil security 
will continue to be a challenging and controversial issue, China cannot hope to 
compete with the United States in naval development and can best safeguard 
its interests by helping Southeast Asian states develop an indigenous capacity to 
address nonstate challenges. He asserts that the United States has promulgated 
a “String of Pearls Strategy” and also that the international community still 
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entertains a “China Energy Threat Theory.” In the end, however, he concludes 
that while China’s energy infrastructure (e.g., the country’s nascent strategic pe-
troleum reserve) is indeed vulnerable to attack, an oil blockade of China is both 
risky and “not likely at all,” primarily because “the fate of the two countries have 
forged a community of destiny, [and therefore] war and military blockade will 
only cause both sides to suffer.”122 Zhao’s view seems to be that while tankers and 
oil storage depots might be tempting military targets, the serious market distur-
bances resulting from attacks upon them would affect all global oil consumers, 
as would China’s likely military response to any attack on its oil assets.
Even advocates of robust PLAN development do not foreswear cooperation. 
One researcher insists that “the building of a powerful Chinese navy is a neces-
sary requirement to ensure China’s oil security” because “if China is to become 
[equal] friends with Americans in the future, we must first become an opponent 
that the U.S. cannot defeat.”123 A variety of Chinese naval analysts further sup-
port the cooperation theme. Writing in China Military Science, two PLAN aca-
demics describe maritime oil security as a problem not of “SLOC security” but 
rather of “regional maritime stability.”124 Another allows that seaborne oil trans-
port remains a security issue in specific instances but maintains that “interna-
tional bilateral and multilateral security cooperation is the necessary trend.”125 
A rather remarkable article on the energy issue in Modern Navy actually links a 
Chinese naval buildup to support a SLOC mission to the principle of “peaceful 
development.” The analysis asserts that “a big and powerful [Chinese] fleet will 
support a stable supply chain,” from which “all oil trading nations benefit. Thus, 
in the era of globalization, a formidable navy is not only in our own country’s 
security interest, but is actually a requirement of global security as well.” This 
analysis concludes that as long as China’s navy continuously engages with the 
outside world, developing opportunities to partner with other countries, the 
world will come to accept, and even welcome, a strong Chinese navy.126 
Nevertheless, a wide variety of Chinese analysts continue to worry that in a 
confrontation the United States would have a range of options for interrupting 
Chinese oil supplies. They are suspicious of U.S. exercises with other regional 
navies. While the United States must continue to pursue its core regional in-
terests and support its allies, it may be able to counter Chinese arguments for 
a PLAN capable of energy/SLOC-security missions by persuading relevant in-
dividuals that it is a genuine guarantor of open SLOCs. The United States can 
enlarge common ground on energy and SLOC security by engaging China and 
the PLAN more through joint exercises (e.g., search and rescue, humanitarian 
assistance, and disaster relief) and strategic dialogue. In promoting constructive 
communications with Chinese interlocutors, it will be important to emphasize 
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that SLOC security is a problem for nations around the world (particularly in 
East Asia), not just for China. 
The depTh of Beijing’S inSeCuriTy
This article has found that discussion of oil SLOC protection within the vo-
luminous naval and maritime affairs literature in contemporary China is not 
extensive, at least in comparison with, for example, undersea warfare or air-
independent propulsion technology. Yet oil SLOC protection has the potential 
to emerge as a major bureaucratic sales point for acquisition of modern, blue-
water platforms, as well as the training and doctrine needed to employ them 
effectively. Already, some Chinese naval and maritime analysts display pointed 
interest in energy issues, and many of these share a fairly distinct general view-
point. The most critical theme that underlies this perspective is China’s per-
ceived current vulnerability to an oil embargo. As one might expect, Chinese 
analysts are reluctant to place their country’s oil security in the hands of other 
great powers, especially the United States. If it does not already serve this role, 
then, the oil issue could offer a potent rationale for continuing or even further 
accelerating China’s naval modernization, especially as Beijing’s military plan-
ners begin to grapple seriously with scenarios beyond Taiwan. Perhaps some-
what more unexpected, given their tone of profound and immediate concern 
for China’s maritime oil security, are the candid admissions of Chinese naval 
and maritime analysts that the PLAN’s capabilities for protecting China’s long 
oil SLOCs are minimal at present. Also, it is somewhat surprising that these 
specialists, while sounding a wide variety of themes, many quite nationalistic in 
character, seem in general to be guardedly open to multilateral oil security co-
operation and appear to understand the importance of trying to preserve good 
relations with Washington. 
Of the many Chinese naval analyses surveyed for this study, among the most 
sophisticated was a lengthy treatment of the oil security question in the October 
2006 issue of Modern Ships. At the conclusion of that analysis, the author articu-
lates a three-point strategy that may encapsulate the Chinese naval community’s 
views on the oil security question: “[China] must view things from the perspec-
tive of keeping the United States from cutting its oil supply lines. Concretely 
speaking, this entails making the United States not willing to cut China’s oil 
supply lines, not daring to do so, and not able to do so.” Though the importance 
of this particular source should not be exaggerated in the absence of informa-
tion concerning its provenance, this statement’s succinct parallelism suggests 
that it might perhaps be influenced by (or even drawn from) some element of 
official internal policy. It further suggests that a web of self-interest would de-
ter the United States from embargoing China and that adept diplomacy could 
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hinder any attempt by Washington to use this leverage. Most surprising, per-
haps, is that this formulation calls not just for strengthened naval forces but also 
nuclear strategic forces as well.127 This perceived need for additional deterrence 
capabilities, apparently driven by concern that the United States might attempt 
to sever Chinese SLOCs in the event of a Taiwan conflict, may truly illustrate the 
depth of Beijing’s insecurity with respect to maritime oil access. 
On the whole, however, means of safeguarding SLOC security remain un-
der debate in China, perhaps offering other states an opportunity to influence 
Beijing’s plans in a way that will support cooperative maritime security. Beijing 
and Washington in particular share a wide range of maritime oil security inter-
ests that could best be promoted through cooperation. The primary threat to 
seaborne oil supplies comes not from national navies but from well organized 
and increasingly capable nonstate actors, such as the pirates that are, at this 
writing, creating havoc in the waters off Somalia. 
Cooperation to blunt nonstate threats to maritime oil shipments can help 
build trust and reduce the potential for state-on-state naval confrontations over 
energy-supply security. It can also be a showcase for how maritime powers like 
the United States can work to integrate China into a global security architecture, 
which will need modifications to accommodate the relative newcomer but offers 
an excellent starting framework. Both official and unofficial diplomacy can help 
build a foundation for a more extensive maritime energy security partnership 
in coming years.
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